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Introduction
An indication of the depth and significance of a philosopher is the frequency in which 
his or her ideas reemerge into philosophical debate. In this sense Aristotle has few peers. His 
works and ideas never cease to stir up the waters and actively contribute to contemporary 
philosophical exchange. This is in evidence in the current virtue epistemology debate.
Over the last couple decades agent-based epistemologies have arisen as attractive 
alternatives to the more traditional belief-based theories of knowledge. In his landmark article, 
The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge' Ernest 
Sosa captured the stalemate in contemporary epistemology using the metaphor of the pyramid to 
represent the foundational ist approach and the raft for the coherentist approach. Both traditional 
belief-based approaches face serious and seemingly intractable objections. Sosa concludes that 
for epistemology to free itself from the apparent impasse, it may be valuable to follow the 
example of ethics. Traditionally, the ethicist seems to be compelled to choose between the Scylla 
of deontic ethics and the Charybdis of consequentialism. The revival of various versions of 
Aristotle’s character based ethical system has offered fresh hope in the seemingly intractable 
debate by reassessing the assumption that the individual acts or moral rules are the primary loci 
of evaluation. By turning away from an act or rule-based approach to an agent-based ethic which 
focuses moral assessment on the attainment and exercise of human virtue (excellences) the 
ethicist seems to bypass some of the more troubling stalemates.
Sosa closes the article with the following suggestion:
The same strategy may also prove fruitful in epistemology. Here primary justification 
would apply to intellectual virtues, to stable dispositions for belief acquisition, through 
their greater contribution toward getting us to the truth.1
The expression “intellectual virtues” calls to mind Aristotle. Unfortunately, Sosa did not expand 
on exactly how intellectual virtues could contribute toward “getting us to the truth.” Yet the 
suggestion has had a fair number of takers. And although many of the agent-based epistemic 
theories which have arisen over the last decade or two, such as Sosa's and Goldman's reliabilism, 
Code's moral responsibilism, Plantiga's proper functionalism, were hesitant to draw direct 
parallels to Aristotle,2 others, most notably Linda Zagzebski, openly associated their theories
1 Ernest Sosa, 1980. 'The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge,' Midwest
Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980): 23. Reprinted in Knowledge in Perspective, Cambridge 1991.
2
In spite of Sosa's valuable and continued contribution to virtue epistemology and his tendency to refer to his theory as 
a virtue theory, I do not consider his theory a true virtue epistemology but rather as a form of reliabilism, similar to that 
of Goldman. See 'Proper functionalism and virtue epistemology' (1993; reprinted in part in Guy Axel (ed.), 2000, 
Knowledge, Belief and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology. Lahnham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers. Pp. 33-40). Sosa seems to confuse virtue with that of faculty or capacity. Nor is Sosa alone. John Greco 
likewise conflates virtue and faculty in his article on Virtue epistemology in the Blackwell Companion to 
Epistemology. He states, "A virtue or faculty in general is a power or ability or competence to achieve some result. An 
intellectual virtue or faculty, in the sense intended above, is a power or ability or competence to arrive at truths in a 
particular field, and to avoid believing falsehoods in that field. Examples of human intellectual virtues are sight, 
hearing, introspection, memory, deduction and induction (Greco, John. 1992. ’Virtue Epistemology’ in A Companion 
to Epistemology edited by Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 1992, 520). Properly speaking a virtue is not a capacity or faculty but the excellence of a capacity or 
faculty; thus seeing is not a virtue but a capacity. Being keen sighted is an excellence of the sight faculty. Zagzebski 
raises similar criticism (1996, 8-9).
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with Aristotle's theory of intellectual virtues as described in the Nicomachean Ethics. This raises 
the following question: Is contemporary virtue epistemology in fact a revival of Aristotle’s 
theory of intellectual virtues and an appeal to Aristotelian epistemology?
In this paper I will examine Linda Zagzebski's theory of virtue epistemology, the most 
explicitly Aristotelian version of the agent-based epistemologies.3 The objective of this analysis 
is threefold: (1) To examine to what extent Zagzebski's virtue epistemology is genuinely 
Aristotelian, particularly in the use of moral and epistemic exemplars. (2) To draw attention to 
some significant concerns regarding the use of exemplars, such as the famous phronimos, in both 
moral and epistemic evaluation. And finally, (3) to offer a critique of Zagzebski's virtue 
epistemology, in which I conclude that the.most serious problem with contemporary virtue 
epistemology philosophically is that it is not Aristotelian enough.
Zagzebski's virtue epistemology
Virtues o f the Mind ( 1996) is the first fully developed argument in favor of virtue 
epistemology.4 Zagzebski begins with the observation that epistemology, like ethics is a 
normative inquiry.5 This can be seen in the very language that we employ while doing 
epistemology. We say 'She ought to believe X over V or 'Belief A merits our acceptance, 
whereas belief B should not be embraced.' Some epistemic moves are good, some bad.
Epistemic stances often receive praise or blame. In so far as epistemology is normative and 
evaluative, epistemology seems to be similar to ethics.
Of course ethics deals with actions and epistemology beliefs. In ethics we seek good 
acts, in epistemology, good beliefs. Since beliefs are held by agents, it is reasonable to view 
some agents as better at producing good beliefs, as in ethics some individuals are better at 
performing good deeds. A person who consistently performs good acts, non-accidentally, based 
on good motives and an enduring character we call morally virtuous. Likewise, according to the 
virtue epistemologist, an individual who consistently and reliably produces good beliefs (that is 
true beliefs), non-accidental ly, from an enduring character should be called intellectually 
virtuous.
Virtue epistemology rejects an atomistic, act-based approach to normative epistemology 
in favor of an agent-based approach. Claiming inspiration from an Aristotelian virtue ethic and 
building on recent advances in reliabilism, virtue epistemology seeks to evaluate epistemology 
on the basis of epistemic excellences. Since epistemic virtues are goods of the agent, Zagzebski 
argues that normative epistemology should be seen as a “branch” or even “subset” of ethics.6
The appeal of virtue epistemology is strong given the apparent impasse faced in 
traditional act-based approaches and as indicated by the recent deluge of scholarly books and 
article collections on the topic. Zagzebski claims that a virtue-based epistemology circumvents 
traditional skepticism, avoids the internalism/extemalism dilemma, evades Gettier-type 
problems, and abandons the unprofitable fixation on justification. It expands traditional 
epistemic inquiry to include creativity, heuristics, intellectual integrity, open-mindedness, and
Julia Driver draws the distinction between epistemic virtue theory (EVT) and virtue epistemology (VE) stating: 
"Virtue epistemology, like virtue ethics, holds that virtue evaluation is primary. Virtue theory, on the other hand, is 
simply concerned with understanding the virtues -- whether they are primary or not" ('Moral and Epistemic Virtue' in 
Axel, 2000, 124). Zagzebski is one of the most able defenders of the former; adding the even more startling claim that 
all epistemic virtues are in fact moral virtues.
4 Zagzebski, Linda. Virtues o f the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
5 Jaegwon Kim begins with a very similar claim in his article, “What is ‘Naturalized Epistemology?”’ in Philosophical 
Perspectives 2: Epistemology, edited by J. E. Tomberlin, 381-405. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing, 1988. 
Virtue epistemology and reliabilism can be seen as further moves in the broader project of naturalizing epistemology. 
See Quine, W. V. "Naturalized Epistemology." In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 69-90. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1969.
6 Zagzebski, 1996:xv. Interestingly Zagzebski does not take the next step that Aristotle suggests: that we subordinate 
ethics (along with epistemology) to politics. EN 1.2 (1094 a26-bl 1).
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other neglected truth-conducive dispositions. Finally, it gives the appropriate attention to 
understanding and wisdom, intellectual faculties that have generally been ignored by both ethics 
and epistemology.
A central task in virtue epistemology is to convince the reader that we should prioritize 
epistemic evaluation of the agent and not the individual belief. There are several reasons to 
prioritize the agent. As mentioned above, a stalemate in terms of more atomistic approaches is 
one reason. However, virtue epistemologists certainly do not want their approach to be seen as a 
last ditch effort in epistemology or an epistemology of desperation. So other arguments are 
needed.
One of the most interesting arguments for shifting epistemic evaluation to the agent is 
Zagzebski's ontological argument. She argues as follows:
Persons are ontologically more fundamental than acts; acts are defined in terms of 
persons. It is reasonable to think, then, that the moral properties of persons are 
ontologically more fundamental than the moral properties of acts, and the latter 
properties ought to be defined in terms of the former. Hence, virtues and vices are 
ontologically more fundamental than the rightness or wrongness of acts. The concept of 
the right act ought to be defined in terms of the concept of virtue.7
Zagzebski then suggests that a similar ontological priority exists in relation to the agent and the 
agent’s epistemological properties. The argument is interesting and clearly draws on Aristotelian 
principles. It is true that the individual is prior to his or her ontological predicates (the nine 
categories). However, the second step seems to be flawed. Acts are not ontologically 
subordinate to virtues in Aristotle’s Categories. Aristotle does not subordinate the category of 
activity to the category of state (virtue). They are ontologically commensurate (just as different 
species are ontologically commensurate). Although the language of this argument is 
Aristotelian, Aristotle does not analyze actions or virtues in this way. Acts are not "defined in 
terms of persons" but in terms of ends (or goods). Ends in turn are evaluated in reference to 
greater ends, with the result being that all actions ultimately are evaluated in terms of the 
summum bonum, the final good. Identifying this good of course is central to books one and ten 
of the Nicomachean Ethics. Virtue is important in Aristotle's ethics in so far as his inquiry shows 
that the summum bonum of human existence is happiness (eudaimonia) and happiness is "an 
activity of the soul in accordance with virtue." Thus virtue or excellence is not a goal because it 
is ontologically prior to the act but because it is constitutive of happiness. Virtues and acts are 
connected in a far more complicated way: Actions are produced inculcated virtues and likewise 
virtues are produced by performing actions well.
Zagzebski is aware that her shift from ends to persons is not the natural reading of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. In fact she concedes that there are two forms of pure virtue theory: the 
happiness-based and the motive-based approach (197). Aristotle follows the happiness-based 
approach; she prefers the motive-based. Either, she insists, can provide a legitimate foundation 
for virtue epistemology.
Zagzebski thus defines an act of intellectual virtue:
An act is an act of intellectual virtue /just in case it arises from the motivational 
component of /, is something a person with /  would characteristically do in the 
circumstances, and is successful in leading to the immediate end of /and to the truth 
because of these features of the act.8
7 Zagzebski, 1996, 79-80.
8 Zagzebski, Linda. "Précis of Virtues of the Mind." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LX, no. 1 (2000): 
175.
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According to this definition there are three components to epistemic virtue:
(1) Motivation
(2) An exemplar of virtue
(3) Success
The motivation component of an intellectual virtue is the desire for truth. This aspect of 
Zagzebski's theory has already received much attention and I do not wish to duplicate the 
criticism of others here.9 Instead, I will focus on the second component of virtue, that of the use 
a virtuous exemplar as a criterion of correct procedure. This is a move that seems to be explicitly 
Aristotelian, at least in term of his theory of moral virtue. For it is often held that Aristotle 
appeals to the phronimos or spoudaios as a moral paradigm valuable in identifying proper 
behavior.
The phronimos as an exemplar of virtue
In "pure" agent based virtue ethics the moral exemplar defines right acts. In the strongest 
versions an act is right because the virtuous individual would dó it. In weaker forms, the fact 
that a virtuous individual would act in such a way is merely confirmatory.
The idea of referring to a moral exemplar is problematic in both virtue ethics and virtue 
epistemology, but for different reasons. Let's begin with the moral exemplar whom Aristotle 
identifies as the man of practical reason [phronimos] or the good man [spoudaios]. If Aristotle 
intends the phronimos to be a moral exemplar useful in identifying correct moral practice or 
procedure then he will have to solve several serious challenges. The first problem is that of 
identifying a moral exemplar. It is presumably possible to misperceive or misidentify the 
exemplar. One might respond that the phronimos for Aristotle is a hypothetical moral ideal, 
much as the ideal sage is in Stoic epistemology. This, however, only complicates the problem 
since now we must imagine, invent, or construct the exemplar. What prevents me from 
importing moral failings into the construction?
What we need then is some criteria for identifying or imagining the exemplar. What 
makes the moral exemplar worthy of emulation and readily identifiable? Presumably the moral 
exemplar is an exemplar because he or she behaves in a certain way or possesses certain virtues. 
And why is this way of behavior better than another? Here we are going to have to evaluate the 
behavior based on certain principles or criteria, for it is the behavior that distinguishes this 
person from another to the external observer. However, if we have such rules or criteria, what 
need is there for an exemplar?10
Even if we are willing to recognize an exemplar as virtuous on the basis of some kind of 
moral intuition,11 we still can't reasonably evaluate an action on the basis of its presence in the
9 It should suffice to say that on this definition true beliefs held by a person (or machine) which did not acquire these 
for the sake of knowledge are esteemed as epistemically flawed. See Greco, John. "Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue." 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LX, no. 1 (2000): 179-84.
10 Zagzebski states, "No set of rules is sufficient to tell us when to place intellectual trust in the reliability of another, or 
what a person with intellectual courage, perseverance, or discretion would do, and so on. For this reason imitation of 
the person withphronesis is important for acquiring both intellectual and moral virtues..." (1996, 150). I agree with 
first part of the statement that rules will never produce a reliable moral or intellectual exemplar, however, I don't see 
how the second part of the statement follows. If anything, the argument shows why we should be weary of moral 
exemplars as primary standards, and not psychological tools (my suggestion -- see below).
11 In one of her less critical moments Zagzebski states, "Many of us have known persons whose goodness shines forth 
from the depth of their being... I believe it is possible that we can see the goodness of a person in this rather direct 
way. She may simply exude a ’glow’ of nobility or fineness of character, or as I have occasionally seen in a longtime 
member of a contemplative religious order, there may be an inner peace that can be perceived to be good directly, not 
simply because it can be explained on the theoretical level as a component of eudaimonia" (1996, 83). My response to 
this perception of a "glow" of virtue is that there are people in the world that are very good at generating such glows; 
we call them con-men, cult leaders, politicians, and movie stars (see the "glow" of Ben Kingsley in Gandhi and contrast 
that to his very different glow in Sexy Beast). In short, a glow is no guarantee of moral integrity.
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exemplar unless we have some guarantee that the exemplar is infallible. This essentially means 
that the intuition must be infallible.12 I do not know how this would be possible.13 Nor am I 
willing to follow Zagzebski's suggestion that we attribute to the exemplar "those qualities that 
have appeared on the greatest number of lists in different places and at different times in 
history."14 The best we can do is compare our intuition with some form of act or rule criterion. 
This, I argue, is what Aristotle does in the Nicomachean Ethics — which should make us 
reconsider the role of the phronimos in Aristotle.
Interestingly, there is an Aristotelian argument against trusting a moral exemplar in the 
manner suggested above. According to Aristotle the moral value of an act is always relative to 
the individual (this is different than being ‘defined by’ or ‘ontologically prior’ as discussed 
above). Just as two pounds of meat is too much for one person and too little for another, so in 
one context one person may reasonably flee a confrontation and still be courageous, while for 
another virtue would demand she stay and fight. Indeed, in Aristotle's evaluation of the various 
forms of human conduct he never tells the reader to ask what a moral exemplar would do.
Instead he asks us to evaluate the conduct in terms of principles such as what would constitute 
excessive and deficient behavior.15 Moreover, he always bids us to consider the specifics of the 
unique situation (the person, timing, object, manner, amount, degree, etc.).
If this is correct, what then is the meaning of the phronimos in the Nicomachean Ethics'? 
In its most basic sense a phronimos is a person possessing the virtue of phronêsis. In book six 
the phronimos represents an ethical type, generally contrasted to the incontinent man; but 
unfortunately Aristotle never fully develops the phronimos. The passage in which people tend to 
use in arguing that the phronimos is an exemplar is in book two; here Aristotle's defines virtue:
Virtue is a state, capable of choice, being in the mean relative to us, [the mean] defined
by reason and as the phronimos would define it.16
However, a careful analysis of this passage shows that the phronimos is not used as an exemplar 
of virtue, but as guide in determining the mean relative to us. In fact, the phronimos drops out of 
sight until book six when he appears in contrast to the morally incontinent agent. So what does 
Aristotle do by adding the phronimos clause that some scholars have made so much of? I suggest 
that this is essentially a technique to avoid the natural tendency of erring toward desire. Aristotle 
suggests that when we evaluate our particular context, we should attempt to be objective. This 
makes sense when we consider the practical syllogism and how our particular desires and 
specific situation affect practical reasoning. By imagining the phronimos performing the 
practical syllogism we are in a better position to identify objectively the mean relative to us. 
Although the juxtaposition o f ‘objectively’ and ‘relative’ may appear paradoxical, in reality, 
these act as mutual checks and partially constitute the brilliance of Aristotle’s system. This 
means that Aristotle uses the phronimos as an exemplar only in a minimal way, as a tool or 
check. The phronimos is not therefore used as a moral or epistemic ideal in the strong sense of
12 Contrast Dregeinski, Shane. "Aristotle’ Fallible Phronimos." Ancient Philosophy 16, no. 1 (1996): 139-54..
13 This is a different question than if the phronimos can possess ‘scientific’ ethical knowledge which is a central 
concern in C.D.C Reeve’s interesting book (Reeve, C. D. C. Practices o f Reason. Oxford: Clarendon, 1992). My 
concern is how those of us who are not phronimoi can identify or utilize the phronimos as a resource in ethical 
judgments.
14 Zagzebski, 1996, 89.
15 This is Jonathan Kvanvig’s criticism of Zagzebski. He states, “The only way to evaluate one person’s beliefs in 
terms of another (or an intellectually enhanced version of the same person) is to have some device in the account to 
guarantee that the total epistemic situation is the same for both individuals. But since one’s understanding of one’s 
circumstance is a central aspect of one’s total epistemic situation (the total evidence one has), the understanding a 
hypothetic person would have of one’s situation need not be relevant at all to the epistemic standing of one’s beliefs.’’ 
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. "Zagzebski on Justification." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LX, no. 1 (2000): 192.
16 EN 2.6,1106 b36-l 107a2. This very literal translation is mine.
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criterion. There is no indication in this passage that we are to examine the virtues of the 
phronimos and attempt to emulate them. Nor am I able to find such advice elsewhere in the 
Aristotelian corpus.
Zagzebski's use of an epistemic exemplar in her definition of intellectual virtues faces the 
same problems as the moral exemplar. First, as with the moral exemplar, there must be 
something which makes one individual an epistemic exemplar and not another. It must be that 
she is such a person as to reliably produce true beliefs (via epistemic virtues) as well as pursue 
truth on the basis of correct motivation. Skipping the motivational component for the moment, 
how do we know that she produces true beliefs? We must analyze those beliefs on grounds 
independent of her character or virtue. Therefore the exemplar cannot be the criterion but only a 
rough guide and short cut. This, I suggest, is how Aristotle uses the phronimos: he operates as a 
tool in moral reasoning, perhaps even a rule of thumb like the principles of erring on the side of 
disinclination mentioned at the end of book II. In short, the phronimos should not be seen 
primarily as an epistemic criterion but a moral aid.
This inability to produce an infallible epistemic exemplar brings us to what I take to be 
the major flaw of virtue epistemology: it assumes that ethics and epistemology are “structurally 
parallel” disciplines. It is at this point that Zagzebski fails to be Aristotelian enough. Aristotle 
repeatedly reminds us that, unlike geometry or science which also make normative claims, ethics 
is an imprecise study. He states that the same precision should not be expected in all subjects, 
but that in ethics we must be content in speaking of truth "roughly and in outline" declaring what 
is "for the most part true." Such is "a mark of good education" (1.3). And again in book two he 
states that ethics does not aim at theoretical knowledge since "matters concerned with conduct 
and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health" (1104a3-5).
Because there cannot be precision, Aristotle is happy to say that the point of ethics is not 
knowledge but good action. He also constantly offers rules of thumb (like erring on the side of 
activities against one's natural inclination) and tools for approximating right actions (such as the 
doctrine of the mean and the phronimos). Epistemology, on the other hand, must be the most 
precise and careful of the sciences since it deals with truth and knowledge itself. Rules of 
thumbs and exemplars are dangerous in epistemology since minor flaws have a way 
compounding. This is why Aristotle is so concerned in identifying the most certain first 
principles and “a principle about which it is impossible to be in error is the firmest of all” {Met. 
iv 1005b 13). It is also why he does not attempt to do true epistemology in Ethics, but refers his 
reader to the Analytics. Should we follow Aristotle's suggestion and go to the {Posterior) 
Analytics we will find an atomistic, belief-based epistemology that is clearly foundationalist -  
not a virtue epistemology.17
Conclusion
I have argued that there are some deep problems in the use of exemplars in virtue 
epistemology as well virtue ethics. This does not mean that they should not be used, but that they 
should be uses with caution and never as a final criterion. The claim that the phronimos is such 
an epistemic exemplar in Aristotle is misleading. In addition, I argued that one of the main 
reasons that Aristotle would resist virtue epistemology is that the fundamental assumption that 
ethics and epistemology are structurally parallel inquiries is incorrect. Aristotle does not make 
epistemology subordinate to ethics or visa versa. These inquiries differ in kind and exactitude. 
Ethics does not permit the same degree of precision as epistemology.
As traditional epistemology tries to force us to choose between foundational ism and 
coherentism, and between internalism and externalism, Zagzebski asks us to choose between act 
and agent. The lesson to be learned from Aristotle is not that epistemology should be 
subordinated to ethics, but rather that ethics and epistemology can be complimentary:
17 See Taylor, C.C.W. "Aristotle's Epistemology." Epistemology; S. Everson (ed) (1990): 116-42. One might call this 
the "orthodox" reading of Aristotelian epistemology.
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Epistemology has a scientific side and a moral side and we should be grateful to the virtue 
epistemology debate for emphasizing and articulating the truth that moral virtues have been 
neglected by epistemologists and that epistemological progress requires the development of 
intellectual virtues. We must learn to evaluate the truth of individual beliefs (epistemology 
proper) and see the moral value of being fully actualized epistemic agents taking into 
consideration the range of epistemological virtues that Zagzebski rightly states are ignored 
(ethics proper). In short, Aristotle teaches us how to do both.
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